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Introduction
Si quis dixerit ‘Medicina non scientia est’, anathema sit.
‘If anyone says medicine is not a science, let him be condemned’.
Readers with more than a cursory familiarity with Roman Catholic
dogmatic theology would be forgiven for imagining that the edi-
torial board charged with the latest revision of Denzinger [1] had
co-opted one of the few remaining apologists of the evidence-
based medicine (EBM) movement to its work. Certainly, if such a
condemnation were to be introduced into that formidable mecha-
nism charged with the protection of the Depositum Fidei, then this
author would surely face formal censure. For it is his opinion that
medicine is decidedly not a science, but rather primarily a human
endeavour which employs science – and only in part [2,3]. Medi-
cine, then, is a science-using practice, but science cannot represent
or be equated with the essence of medicine in any fundamental
sense. In describing medicine, we must therefore draw the distinc-
tion between the word scientiﬁc (which correctly describes much
of medicine’s knowledge) and the word science (which falsely
describes medicine’s nature). It was a considerable honour to
deliver a keynote Lecture on this core thesis to Università La
Sapienza in Rome in late 2008. The current Essay presents the
central argumentation advanced within the Lecture and builds
upon the elements of the discussions that took place subsequent
to the Address.
The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes ‘progress’as ‘forward or
onwardmovementtowardsadestination’,or‘developmenttowards
a better, more complete modern condition’ [4]. Does, then, the
accumulation of a science base on which medicine can draw,
represent progress by this deﬁnition, or not?Yes, this is incontro-
vertible, if we accept the ‘destination’of medicine as the complete
prevention of disease or the possibility of complete therapeutic
success.Butcansuchprogressbringwithitdisadvantagesaswellas
advantages? Yes, this too is incontrovertible in my view, and as I
shall aim to show.The advantages of the accumulated science base
of medicine are well known and have enabled hitherto undreamed
oftherapeuticprogressandhugeshiftsinindividualandpopulation
health,indeedexponentiallysowithinthelast120years[5–7].Less
well understood and appreciated are, however, the disadvantages
occasionedbythedevelopmentofthesciencebaseofmedicineand
it is the recognition and study of these which is a prerequisite for
their minimization or even eradication, without which minimiza-
tion and eradication, the progress of truly humanistic medicine
will remain interrupted. What, then, is Medicine for? Where has
Medicinegonewrong?WhatcanwedotoputMedicinerightagain?
What is medicine for?
A vast literature has accumulated on the ethos, nature and historic
mission of medicine, but for the purposes of the present work, I
dare to summarize here the foundational philosophy of medicine
as: ‘to cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always’.Attrib-
uted originally to Hippocrates by some authors, but traced back
only to the ﬁfteenth century by others, this striking maxim became
far more closely associated in recent times with the nineteenth
century physician Dr Edward Livingstone Trudeau. Trudeau
arrived at Saranac Lake in theAdirondack mountains of NewYork
in 1872 preparing to die from pulmonary tuberculosis, but in
fact continued to live until 1915 (a longevity which he attributed in
part to the characteristics of his environment), founding a number
of important health facilities and sanatoria at Saranac Lake dur-
ing that time. On a statue of Trudeau created by the celebrated
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1918, 3 years after Trudeau’s death (and currently housed in the
Trudeau Institute on Algonquin, Saranac Lake) are those very
words describing the mission of medicine in the French: Guerir
quelquefois, soulager souvent, consoler toujours. The original
maxim must surely be prefaced today with ‘To prevent illness as
far as possible’ and might, perhaps, be concluded with: ‘and to
assist death when necessary’, although while the imperative for the
former is established within medicine, the possibility of the latter
remains a subject of intensive ongoing philosophical, legal and,
indeed, greatly emotional debate. If, then, we omit from current
consideration this last possibility and retain as we must the ﬁrst,
then are we able to claim that modern medicine has fulﬁlled these
four conceptually different, yet highly interrelated missions?
I answer in the negative for all but the second and argue that
medicine has ‘gone wrong’ in the ﬁrst, third and fourth.
Where has medicine gone wrong?
The consequences of medicine’s ‘going wrong’, a malfunction
which has resulted from a disproportionate emphasis on the
second imperative of the four missions of medicine considered
above, is that medicine has ceased to be holistic in its nature,
a seriously worrying development which calls for an urgent expla-
nation.Aetiologically, the loss of holism in medicine has occurred
as a direct function of a growing scientistic reductionism in medi-
cine in the face of a dramatically increasing complexity [8]. The
symptoms of such scientistic reductionism are seen in the very
existence and characteristics of the EBM movement [9–22] and in
the substantial increase in interest in complementary and alterna-
tive medicine (CAM) and its practitioners being shown by patients
internationally [23]. As Gordon [24] has said, biomedicine, once
seen as a potential cure-all, has limits and dangers that are now
more clearly understood by patients than ever before and this
observation, coupled with a diminution in caring in medicine, has
resulted in the public acceptance of alternative medicine, directly
challenging the newly acquired primacy of the biomedical para-
digm and occasioning outrage within clinical and scientiﬁc circles.
This has led some doctors to despair in the face of public credulity
and others to jump onto a lucrative bandwagon, paradoxically
multiplying the potential for harm to patients. If a growing number
of patients are rejecting the sufﬁciency of orthodox medicine
alone, it is not because it is ineffective, but rather because it has
become inhuman and depersonalized.
That medicine is convulsing over this metamorphosis – the
transmogriﬁcation from an entirely necessary holism to the reduc-
tionist, technical application of procedures and administration of
drugs which now typiﬁes modern medical practice in the Western
world – is demonstrated not least in part by the current epistemo-
logical crisis in medicine [25], but also by the rise in interest by
medically trained practitioners themselves in so-called integrated
(ive) medicine, in the medical humanities, in spiritual/religious
care and in patient-focused, relationship-centred clinical practice
in general [26]. It would seem, then, as if we are in the midst of
a battle for the heart and soul of medicine itself between two
increasingly separate philosophies whose future is surely not to
exist as polar opposites, but rather to function as an united whole,
integrated then, in the direct service of patient and clinician, medi-
cine and human progress.
The misrepresentation of medicine
If it is accepted that medicine is not a science, but rather a science-
using practice, then why do doctors collude in the misrepresenta-
tion of medicine as a science, subordinating the noble arts of
medicine to positivistic reductionism, so that the science and arts
of medicine are decoupled, suggesting that they can function as
alternatives? First, and as Montgomery [2] points out, the status of
medicine in Society depends in considerable measure on the sci-
entiﬁc nature of much of its information, a status that the majority
of doctors would be loathed to relinquish. But the increase in the
scientiﬁc nature of medicine that has underpinned this status does
not make medicine a science. Second, when one examines the
abilities of medicine to ameliorate, attenuate and cure conditions
and diseases in 1899, for example, and compare it to the present
year of 2009 – or even halfway to the 1960s – then it is easy to
understand the awe, excitement, joy and optimism of the modern
clinician when he looks at his own potential and compares it
directly to that of his predecessors. He will be right to recognize
that it is has been the rapidly expanding science base of medicine
that has represented the prime mover of such staggering progress.
Certainly, a huge accumulation of biological knowledge of rel-
evance to the care of patients has resulted in a quite extraordinary
expansion of the drug-based therapeutic armamentarium and
where this increase in pharmacotherapeutics and biological thera-
pies has been matched by an equally extraordinary increase in the
library of technical procedures in medicine and surgery. These
developments have revolutionized, to be sure, the scope and power
of medicine and the nature of its effects and outcomes in individu-
als and populations. But this accumulation of the science base of
medicine, while it has made medicine more scientiﬁc, does not
make medicine a science. Third, in times of illness and distress,
patients want, indeed perhaps need, to consider their physicians as
learned, assured and quintessentially infallible ﬁgures. The allure
of science as a means of attaining such ‘perfection’ in practice is
clearly very attractive to clinicians and patients and so, for their
own respective reasons, neither patients nor doctors are motivated
to challenge this folie a deux [2]. But submitting to this allurement
does not make medicine a science. Rather, it perpetuates the
myth of medicine as science, representing a serious intellectual
dishonesty among doctors that increases their self-delusion in this
context and raises unrealistic expectations in patients, the outcome
of which can be seen in the huge rise in malpractice claims
and negligence suits and in the necessity to institute increasing
numbers of health care quality assurance and risk management
programmes within international health services. Is the existence
of such developments commensurate with the idea of medicine as
a replicable, quasi-infallible, probabilistically predictable science?
I think not.
On the basis of these observations, Montgomery [2] is surely
right to argue that we therefore make a great, even dangerous
mistake about medicine when we assume it to be a science in the
realist Newtonian sense, or even as Lewis Thomas once described
it, as the ‘youngest science’. Indeed, such an assumption leads
directly to the expectation that medical knowledge is invariant,
objective and always replicable – which it most certainly is not
[2,3]. So if medicine is not a science, then is it an art? For me, the
answer is unexpectedly simple, even if the process is not. Medicine
is neither a science nor an art, but rather a rational practice based
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gomery sees the art and science of medicine in terms of a binary
economy, where art and science need to be yoked together yet held
apart in order to accrue the strengths of their polar positions – soft
versus hard, intuitive versus analytical, inductive versus deductive,
visual versus logical [2]. For her, then, an inadequate understand-
ing of this interrelationship has the potential to render medicine
facilely described and poorly understood, given that medicine is
far more than just a body of scientiﬁc knowledge and a collection
of well-practised skills, but rather the conjunction of the two: ‘the
rational, clinically experienced and scientiﬁcally informed care of
sick people’ [2]. For Leggett [27], the practice of medicine has
advanced from being an art to become a scientiﬁc art. He acknowl-
edges that there are those who would wish it to progress to the
level of applied science, but recognizes that this would devastate
medicine’s properly holistic nature in favour of the medical
scientism we shall consider shortly.
Science cannot cure or care, doctors do
Science, then, cannot care, it itself is not a caring profession as
Medicine and Nursing are, although science can cure sometimes,
even often, when properly employed within clinical practice.
Indeed, it is often said that until it is possible for clinicians to cure
always or ameliorate completely, it is their ‘reasonable responsi-
bility’ to provide the comfort of genuine human empathy. Such
reasoning, while entirely noble in sentiment, seems to assume that
comforting is a substitute for curing when curing is not possible,
such that when curing becomes possible, it will substitute for
comforting, that comforting and caring would somehow then
become ipso facto redundant and unnecessary. In reality, curing
should never be disassociated from comforting and caring; other-
wise, medicine becomes nothing more than the application of
technical procedures or the administration of medications outside
of the context of the necessarily human encounter of which we
have made mention earlier. In ceasing to hold fast to such impera-
tives, medicine has gone badly ‘wrong’.
Having become seduced by the power of science and overesti-
mating its signiﬁcance in the care of the individual as a result,
assisted by the errors of EBM (which I shall consider in some
detail below), doctors now no longer consider it their role to
provide the person-centred, relationship-based, holistic model of
care that was viewed essential by their predecessors and held as a
natural inclination of the vocation to medicine. This inclination,
nourished in the undergraduate and early postgraduate years and
then exercised automatically in practice, led to a reﬁnement of
technique and a depth of understanding deriving from the ongoing
experience of the dilemmas and circumstances of patients and,
indeed, from those in the doctor’s own life, all of which knowl-
edge, when experienced, and with the relevant lessons learned,
was routinely employed, and extremely valuably so, in the care of
patients. Having progressively disintegrated caring from curing,
attenuating and ameliorating, medicine as it is practised today, has
become radically incomplete, its entirely necessary holism conse-
quently fractured, if not left in ruins.
The central cause of this disintegration of good medical practice
has been the rise of scientism. What shall we say of scientism?
How do we recognize it in Society in general and in Medicine in
particular? Certainly, a large literature has examined the pheno-
menon itself and the reader is referred to two notable texts for
substantial study [28,29]. Sufﬁce it is, for the purposes of this
Essay, to reﬂect brieﬂy on its principal characteristics, in order to
illustrate its emergence in medical theory and practice and to call
for its urgent removal.
Scientism
There are, to be sure, many deﬁnitions of scientism. My own
deﬁnition, based on Hayek [30], Ryder [31] and Haack [29], reads
as follows:
Scientism is a philosophical position that exalts the methods
of the natural sciences above all other modes of human
inquiry, such that the embrace of empiricism and mechanical
materialist thought as means of explication of physical, social,
cultural and psychological phenomena, results in a positivistic
and dogmatic stance that, in an abuse of reason, transmogri-
ﬁes a rational philosophy of science into an irrational one, far
more likely to obscure a proper understanding of the human
life and condition than to enable it.
Scientism derives from the general empiricism of the Enlight-
enment and is most frequently associated with the thinking of
August Comte [32]. Comte, who died at the age of 59 in 1857, held
that true knowledge is derived only from perceptual experience,
cleaving, then, to a fairly absolutist empiricism which insists that
‘truth’ and ‘knowing’ can only arise from objective observation,
experiment and analysis.
Comte’s vision embraced the so-called Newtonian ideal – that
objective and replicable observation is the only basis for real
knowledge. While certainly hugely inﬂuenced by the Enlighten-
ment, he freely attacked several of its leading philosophers.
He objected strongly, for example, to the concept of freedom
of thought. For Comte, this was a dogma, an entirely negative
concept that had the potential, if not direct effect, of sabotaging the
social order. Indeed, consider this:
It is only through the positive polity (that) the revolutionary
spirit can be harnassed...t h epositive spirit tends to consoli-
date order...a n dsupports the general order by leading peo-
ple’s understanding back to the normal condition, through the
inﬂuence of method, before there has been time to develop
some social theory. It dispels disorder by once and for all
ﬁxing a series of undebatable conditions for the study of
political questions. [33]
Reﬂecting on such statements, it is unsurprising, perhaps, to
learn that scientism claims that all philosophy is a ‘bourgeois
invention’, that social science and psychology should be reduced
to biology and that because science, as a ‘politically neutral
endeavour’, can combat irrationalism and obscurantism, it should,
therefore, reign supreme in the understanding and organization of
human Society [34,35].
Such argumentation, perhaps more accurately described as
hallucination, immediately demonstrates the ‘ideological straight-
jacket’ofpositivism,suchthatComtedirectlycreatesajustiﬁcation
inphilosophyforauthoritarianism[36].Scientismexplicitlyclaims
that the natural sciences have authority over all other systems of
knowledge generation and knowing, whether these are philosophi-
cal, religious/spiritual, humanistic or mystical. Thus, scientism,
by its radically ideological nature, precludes all real insight into
the meaning and purpose of human life, suffering and death, into
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Literature,Philosophy,Psychology,Religion/Spirituality,theemo-
tions; that is to say, it directly diminishes importance of all of the
things which matter most in human life. Scientism is therefore
totalitarian by its nature and with strident arrogance assumes and
asserts that science and scientiﬁc inquiry alone have the capacity




even though it has become in an increasingly secularizing Society
a form of faith and belief in itself [38]. Depressingly, we see the
spectacle of scientism violating the authority of non-scientiﬁc
disciplines with, for example, claims that scientiﬁc knowledge can
be a source of human values as well as a source of explanation
of meaning and purpose, a manifest absurdity, since the former
remains the preserve of Morality and Ethics and the latter the
preserve of Theology and Religion. The idea that science can
explain and guide human existence and that what it cannot explain
now it will eventually come to explain as a function of its own
advancement has been aptly termed the ‘Myth of Progress’ [39].
It is precisely because science cannot answer some of the most
fundamental questions of relevance to human life that scientism
is so toxic as a dogma – it leaves unanswered the central questions
of relevance to human existence and should it ever be allowed to
achieveanultimatedominancewithinSocietyandMedicinewould
hugely impoverish what it is to be human and whole.
Scientists and scientism
Can those individuals and doctors accused of scientism still
qualify for the description of scientist (a word, incidentally, ﬁrst
coined only in 1833 by the English philosopher-priest-theologian
and historian of scienceWilliamWhewell [40]) or should they lose
this appellation on the basis that their scientism ipso facto dem-
onstrates their ignorance of the limits of science through over-
estimating its strengths? After all, such an overestimation of the
limits of science and the misunderstanding it represents actually
does science, in reality, a considerable disservice. To argue for the
summary removal of a title is always problematic; we will all be
guilty at some juncture of exaggerating the status and relevance of
something for which we feel a strong attachment – enthusiasm and
excitement predispose to this. So perhaps we can think in terms
of two very different forms of scientist. One who appreciates
the limits of science and rightly seeks to explore if and how those
limits might be diminished. And another type of scientist who
dismisses the very notion that science can have any limits. For this
latter and very particular form of scientist, if current science has
limits, it is because more science is needed to overcome the limits
and correct as part of this process a deﬁcit that has simply been
waiting to be corrected.We may call the latter individual a scientist
rather than employ the word scientismist, but the person still
remains well described as a ‘scientistic scientist’, because some
form of descriptor is required to distinguish our second form of
scientist from our ﬁrst.
Certainly, a doctor who is justly accused of scientism, a scien-
tistic physician, is in my own view axiomatically a bad doctor, as
good medicine can never be characterized by the intellectual inco-
herence of radical reductionism and a fundamental misjudgement
of the foundational nature of medicine as primarily a human
endeavour informed, but not dictated to, by its science base. Could
the use of the term scientism in the context of EBM represent
nothing more than a rhetorical device designed to marginalize
an important new movement on the basis of myopic traditiona-
lism and nostalgia for the humanistic ﬂavour of a medicine long
demised? I would argue vigorously to the contrary. It is precisely
EBM’s appeal to scientiﬁc authority in a ﬁeld – Medicine – where
science applies only partially and its privileging of scientiﬁc
method and scientiﬁc knowing above all other forms of under-
standing and knowing that is my justiﬁcation for the use of
the term.
Scientism, absolutism and arrogance
Scientists are often accused of arrogance and inﬂexibility as a
function of their success within their respective ﬁelds, displaying
characteristics more in the manner of the religious fundamentalist
than in that of the objective intellectual. If the reader would wish
to dispute such assertions, he might like ﬁrst to consider the
following from Dawkins’ The Selﬁsh Gene [41] which has led to
that author being labelled ‘hysterically scientistic’:
Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is Man?
When you are actually challenged to think of pre-Darwinian
answers to the(se) questions, can you, as a matter of fact,
think of any that are not now worthless except for their
(considerable) historical interest? There is such a thing as
being just plain wrong, and that is what, before 1859, all
answers to these questions were.
In fact, when it comes to understanding Theology and Philo-
sophy well enough to be able to come to such an extraordinary
conclusion, Dawkins has displayed an arresting ignorance that is
immediately apparent to anyone remotely familiar with Thomas
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica or as even a cursory read of The
Dawkins Delusion [42] would illustrate. Let us now turn to how
such examples of scientism, within the word constraints of this
article, can be seen increasingly in modern medicine and how they
have precipitated a crisis in medicine’s properly holistic nature.
EBM codiﬁes the new scientism in medicine
The advent and rise of EBM codiﬁes the modern scientism
in medicine, then, and demonstrates all of the characteristics of
scientism: radical reductionism, the privileging of the scientiﬁc
method and inquiry above all others and a marked tendency
to totalitarianism, even microfascism [8–22,43,44], explaining in
large measure the modern antagonism in medicine to holism.
Leggett is clear that the form of scientism we are now able to see
in medicine may be deﬁned as: ‘an approach to medical practice
that regards the scientiﬁc understanding of the disease as the only
relevant issue, while ignoring other factors’ [27]. Such a thesis,
surely, leads directly to the assumption that what is right for the
disease is automatically right for the patient, representing a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the relationship between the
partial nature of the disease and the totality of the person. EBM,
being predicated on such reasoning, provides a major, if not the
principal illustration, of where medicine has ‘gone wrong’,
threatening to disturb the character of medicine as a practice
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a primacy of the biomedical paradigm and promoting the fallacy
of the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ as fundamental to modern medical
theory and practice [9–22].
Evidence-based medicine’s over-reliance on science in clinical
practice, especially the place of scientiﬁc data derived from the
methodologically limited study designs of the randomized con-
trolled trial, megatrial and meta-analysis, represents not only an
inadequate appreciation of the power of alternative sources of
knowledge for clinical practice, but also a frank fetishisation
of science. In fact, EBM has demonstrated real scientism, indeed
a scientistic fetishism that exalts probability values, denigrates
clinical expertise and which reaches its orgasm in the cumulative
meta-analysis of randomized studies [20]. In this way, EBM
actually promotes bad rather than good clinical medicine by
claiming that it alone represents the true epistemic voice of
medicine, while at the same time utterly failing to represent
medical knowledge adequately and excluding the human inter-
pretation that constitutes the fundamental basis of the historic
mission of medicine [45–48]. As I have argued previously, not
all questions relevant to clinical decision making are scientiﬁc in
their nature and these therefore cannot be answered by science.
Science cannot, therefore, provide the basis for good clinical
practice in any fundamental sense [11]. Good clinical decisions
are typically made through a plurality of means and are formu-
lated with what might be termed the ‘evidence of the clinic’,
constituted not solely by scientiﬁc data, but from a variety of
other sources including raw clinical experience, complex patient
biography, a ‘telling phrase’, even an ‘inadvertent gesture’ [49].
The idea that the technique of EBM could be used to determine
the extent to which a physician’s practice was based on ‘cold’
scientiﬁc data and then to judge one physician’s practice
as ‘evidence-based’ and another’s as ‘non evidence-based’ was
always an intellectual and clinical absurdity destined to obscure
excellence in clinical practice, rather than to identify and illumi-
nate it [11,20]. Data derived from epidemiological studies are
data only and they require contextual interpretation by expert
clinicians and integration into a much larger theoretical base for
such information to become a contribution to medical knowledge
that may or may not be applicable to the individual case [50].
Tobin is clear on this point and elegantly illustrates not only the
intellectual absurdities of EBM, but also its capacity to cause
harm to patients [51,52].
The core concepts of EBM therefore worsen the crisis in
medical holism, not diminish it and the poverty of EBM in assist-
ing a return to a properly humanistic medicine for the future
is seen in its inability or refusal to emerge from the epistemic
cage of ‘biomedicalism’ [53], risking, through its foundational
and continuing positivistic reductionism, the description of
empiricist quackery [54]. If that is how the leaders of EBM wish
their ‘screaming baby’[11] to be immortalized within the History
of Medicine, and if they wish for themselves to merit the descrip-
tion of empiricist quacks rather than as scientists who were eager
to engage with their critics in the pursuit of knowledge through
reason, then so be it. Certainly, their recent attempt to defend
their creed against scientism and to generate a philosophically
tenable explanation of their reasoning [55] has been summarily
dismissed by a series of devastating analyses and critiques
[25,56–61].
How can we put medicine right again?
Weatherall, former Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford
University, writing in the current Oxford Textbook of Medicine,
is clear that:
‘modern medical practice, with its increasingly reductionist
approach to the study of disease, has tended to focus attention
more on disease mechanisms than on those who are suffering
from the diseases that fascinate us so much. We must address
this balance and return to a more holistic approach to medical
care without allowing ourselves to develop those uncritical
attitudes and reliance on received wisdom that permeated the
medical profession for so many centuries’. [62]
Weatherall agrees, then, that medicine has become far more
interested in diseases than in the people who suffer from them.
Certainly, it is increasingly easy to observe a growing number of
doctors in Western health services who view the person of the
patient as an irritating distraction between themselves and the
disease they are attempting to treat. To ‘put medicine right again’
we must therefore correct this highly negative development and
address how the accumulated and accumulating science base of
medicine can be applied to the care of patients through the proper
practising of the arts of medicine and not in isolation from them.
Because the arts of medicine have become progressively disinte-
grated from clinical practice as the scientism of medicine has
advanced, it is clearly necessary to reintegrate these devalued
techniques back into routine clinical practice and as soon as pos-
sible. Indeed, the urgency with which this must be done is increas-
ing as a function of the increasing scientiﬁc nature of medicine and
the almost daily advancements in its science base. We need only
take one example of these, personalized medicine, to illustrate the
general point. Personalized medicine [63], while it offers tremen-
dous potential for individually tailored care based principally on
the genomic proﬁle of the individual, by adding so powerfully (and
necessarily) to the science base of medicine, could have the
adverse consequence of exacerbating the art deﬁcit as the excite-
ment it generates in scientiﬁcally personalizing and dictating spe-
ciﬁc interventions risks concentrating all clinical attention upon
the given disease to the exclusion of the person presenting with it.
Here, as so often in modern medical practice now, it is the inter-
vention that is made personal to the disease and not the relation-
ship made personal between doctor and patient, so that the disease
is seen as the whole and not the patient acknowledged as such. It
is easy to see, then, how Leggett’s deﬁnition of medical scientism
becomes immediately applicable here [27].
What is the way forward?
Putting Medicine ‘right again’ by moving away from scientistic
reductionism in clinical practice in the direction of a properly
holistic approach to care is urgently necessary, because a medicine
based on science alone is a radically incomplete form of clinical
practice that serves neither patient nor doctor well, impoverishing
both in large measure. Scheurich [64] has noted that medical
practice has become a ‘fairly positivistic and soulless discipline
overall’, needing quickly to re-learn what it has forgotten in a
century of empiricism. Indeed, Tournier, who I have considered at
length elsewhere [26], at no point denied the usefulness of efforts
to synthesize a greater scientiﬁc knowledge of man, but was clear
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one side of man’s nature – that of his mechanisms. For Tournier,
such knowledge was of itself incomplete as a basis for clinical
practice and would need to be augmented with a personal knowl-
edge which is of a different order – the order of the person, not that
of things. This knowledge Tournier believed to be within the reach
of every clinician, ‘be he an ordinary general practitioner or a
learned specialist’ [65]. He deplored a medical practice based on
bioscience alone, considering it a ‘dangerous activity’, ‘lacking
the integration of body, mind and spirit necessary for health and
wholeness’. For him, illness raised two very different sorts of
questions – scientiﬁc questions and spiritual ones, so that for
Tournier, the whole of medicine was summed up by an imperative
to help men to live well and then to help them to die [66].
Medicine must, with reference to such philosophy, remember,
then, that health, sickness and suffering involve the ‘essence of the
human being’ and that health care professionals are called to care
for the whole person, in all his integrity, such that service of the
sick ‘embraces all of the dimensions of the human person: physi-
cal, psychological, spiritual and social’ [67]. It is therefore vital
that the care of the sick is considered and enacted from a human-
istic as well as from a technical perspective. As Puchalski [68]
emphasizes, an emphasis on cure or disease relies primarily on the
scientiﬁc model of care with a focus on healing or illness bringing
the patient and physician into a clinical context. When arriving at
this point, the patient’s wishes, beliefs and values play an imme-
diately important role in decision making and in the formulation
and operation of the treatment plan. Puchalski is clear that the
clinician’s ability to form a compassionate relationship with the
patient is as important as the clinician’s ability to diagnose and
treat the patient scientiﬁcally. Typically, conversations with the
patient about his values, needs and worries, transform the clinical
encounter and are readily achievable within explicit ethical
parameters. To be effective, clinicians must not only address the
disease but also know the patient as a person. In understanding
the inseparable connection between body, mind and spirit, doctors
have the capacity to rediscover the insight of Hippocrates [69–71]
– and should do so. In referring to Hippocrates, let us turn also
to Plato: ‘as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the
head or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt
to cure the body without the soul...f o rt h epart can never be well
unless the whole is well’ [72].
Education of medical students and doctors
How will holism be returned to medical practice? First and fun-
damentally, existing doctors and certainly those in training must be
taught the limitations of the biomedical paradigm as well as its
strengths. Montgomery is clear, and I wholeheartedly agree, that it
should be inculcated in students that science is a tool of medicine
and not its soul and that, within a formal moral framework, stu-
dents should be taught how to act wisely for the good of the patient
in what is an uncertain ﬁeld of knowledge. Indeed, as Bertrand
Russell has said in a more general context, ‘the central problem of
our age is how to act decisively in the absence of certainty’. Here,
the development and exercise of clinical judgement is fundamental
[2,3,73,74]. While doctors employ the scientiﬁc or hypothetico-
deductive approach, they also utilize the practical or interpretive
and narrative approach, so that while clinicians rely in consider-
able measure on biological understandings of disease, it is the
application of scientiﬁc knowledge in a rational, science-using
process that characterizes the work of a doctor [2].This fact should
never be lost sight of and taught constantly. Indeed, biological
knowledge, which is typically general, variable and evolving is, by
its very nature, limited in the care of individual patients, so that it
can never be directly applied in a technical or formulaic manner.
While scientiﬁc generalizations play an important part in the
practical reasoning of medicine, ‘neither biological facts nor epi-
demiological probabilities go very far alone’ [2]. General truths
therefore require particularization to the individual (just as in Law
and Moral Theology) through careful interpretation and the exer-
cise of judgement in what are frequently varying, changing and
incompletely speciﬁed circumstances. Doctors do not reason,
therefore, as scientists do and, for the reasons given immediately
above, neither should they try to within the clinical encounter. As
part of good clinical practice, clinicians should always consider
the merits of substituting ‘top down’, deductive, scientiﬁc methods
of reasoning for case-based reasoning, remembering that case
narration remains an important means of thinking and remember-
i n g–o fknowing in clinical practice.As with scientiﬁc knowledge,
students should be taught the limitations as well as the strengths of
narrative-based medicine, avoiding, as with scientiﬁc knowledge,
an over-reliance on narrative evidence, but appreciating the intrin-
sic value of the patient’s story in understanding key elements
of the individual case and in providing a form of accumulating
insight and knowledge for subsequent use [45–48,75,76].
Avoiding the dichotomization of
medical practice
Currently, a growing dichotomy can be seen in medical practice,
such that it is possible to observe a reductionist, often scientistic
form of practice versus a broader, holistic model. Patients have
always been able to recognise, readily, a caring doctor from an
uncaring one, but the advent of so-called integrated (ive) medicine
in recent times, which argues for the use of complementary and
alternative therapies alongside orthodox treatments and empha-
sizes a compassionate, relationship-centred model of care [23] is
widening this gap, perhaps even formalizing it at the present time.
For my part, I think the emergence of a new dichotomy of ‘holistic
practitioner’ versus ‘non-holistic practitioner’, rather in the
manner called for initially by EBM of an ‘evidence-based practi-
tioner’versus a ‘non-evidence-based practitioner’[77], while deli-
ciously ironic after the dominance of EBM in recent times, would
nevertheless represent a highly negative development in modern
health services. The answer to ‘putting medicine right again’ is
therefore not the development of new educational courses outside
of the medical curriculum aimed at creating ‘holistic practitioners’
alongside ‘standard’ones, but surely the introduction of enhanced
teaching of the philosophical and methodological basis of medical
holism within the existing undergraduate and postgraduate cur-
ricula. In this way we will avoid not only the dichotomy of practice
to which I refer directly above and which is becoming a dangerous
reality within modern medicine, but we will also be far better
placed to regulate the content of what is taught about the nature of
holism, rather than relegate such freedoms to incompetent higher
educational establishments and/or to self-interested groups.
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well-regulated medical curricula, there will of course continue
to be a place for the development of postgraduate diplomas and
higher degrees which teach, in a competent and analytical fashion,
the principles of holism in health care. Even following a much
hoped for developing of the undergraduate and postgraduate cur-
ricula in the way I have described, nothing prevents the develop-
ment of higher degrees which examine in particular and highly
detailed fashion the individual components of holistic care as part
of an advanced and highly specialized study. Such is the academic
nature of medicine and the essence of specialism, but we must
guard against the development of two distinct models of medical
practice at all cost.
Educating patients in the limitations
of medicine
Given that patients increasingly demand clinical certainty and
where they remain intolerant of clinical error, a more accurate
understanding that medicine is not a science, that it is not repli-
cable and certain, but rather imprecise and fallible, would lower
the expectations of patients and would enable doctors to be more
honest about the limitations of their trade. In reality, the funda-
mental misrepresentation of medicine as science has a contrary
and directly negative result – it ‘conceals’ or certainly obviates
discussion of, the human and fallible nature of medical practice
with largely predictable results – one of which is the increase in
malpractice and negligence claims and another in the rise in health
care quality improvement and risk management programmes to
which I have already referred earlier. As patients are increasingly
demanding a more caring and holistic medical practice, in addition
to one based on accepted science, the provision of treatment in a
holistic manner, while at the same time educating patients in the
limitations of medicine as a practice in general, would therefore do
much to consolidate the relationship of, and contract between,
Medicine and Society.
Abandoning the scientistic reductionism
of EBM
Practising holistic medicine will necessarily involve the abandon-
mentofthecoretenetsofEBM.Thatmedicineshouldbeinformed,
and not dictated to, by its accumulated and accumulating science
base demonstrates the fundamental irreconcilability of EBM with
good medicine, despite EBM’s absurd and hubristic attempts to
equate itself with good clinical practice as if the two were synony-
mous and coterminus. It is errant nonsense to suggest the two are
equatable. Sir Douglas Black, for example, was clear on this point
overadecadeagowhenwritingintheJournaloftheRoyalCollege
ofPhysiciansofLondonandlittlehaschangedsince[78].Theserial
conceptual and methodological reconstitutions of EBM in the face
of philosophical and clinical analysis and critique have represented
the results of efforts by the advocates of EBM ‘to square a circle’.
Strikingly,thelatesttreatisetoemergefromtheEBMcommunityin
anultimatelyunsuccessfulattempttovalidateitsoverallcreed[55],
admits overtly and speciﬁcally that the need to integrate patients’
valuesandpreferencesintoclinicalpractice,whentheseopposethe
selection of treatments indicated optimal by medicine’s science
base, is a ‘vexing issue’(!).The protagonists of EBM ﬁnd the issue
‘vexing’precisely because they are unable or unwilling to counte-
nancetheideathatthesciencebaseofmedicineshouldbeprevented
from dictating treatment decisions. For them, patients’ values
and preferences derived from their fears, hopes, anxieties, socio-
cultural context and faith or spirituality must take second place to
‘theevidence’.Thisisnottheintegrationofpreferencesandvalues
into clinical decision that they talk of in their constantly changing
deﬁnitions of EBM and to which they continue to pay lip service
only, but rather the subordination of preferences and values to ‘the
evidence’and therefore a direct formula for the violation of patient
autonomy. This notion and practice cannot be described as good
medicine, it is, in fact, the antithesis: arrogant, paternalistic, reduc-
tionist, unethical and totalitarian – and formally scientistic.I ti sf o r
this reason that I argue that the rejection of the core tenets of EBM
withinclinicalmedicineisafundamentalprerequisiteforareturnto
holism in medicine, an imperative which patients increasingly
demand.
Conclusion
The slide by many of the leaders of modern medicine into a
positivistic reductionism, leading to the embrace of scientism
in medicine, is well characterized as empiricist quackery [54] and
rightlyleadstothedescriptionofthepractitionersofanon-holistic,
scientistic medicine as empiricist quacks. The current nature of
medicine, heavily inﬂuenced by EBM, which in itself formally
codiﬁes and embodies the modern scientism in medicine, has
resulted in a radically incomplete form of clinical practice that
beneﬁts neither practitioner nor patient and which has interrupted
medical progress. Putting medicine ‘right again’ will therefore
necessitate an urgent and fundamental reappraisal of the nature
of knowledge for clinical practice and an appreciation that by no
meansalloftheknowledgecentrallynecessaryforeffectiveclinical
practice is scientiﬁc in its nature. Suck knowledge is not unscien-
tiﬁc, but rather non-scientiﬁc. Doctors should therefore combine
great scientiﬁc competence with a great heart [79]. Indeed, medi-
cine, while certainly continuing to refer closely to an ever-
expanding scientiﬁc knowledge base, remains fundamentally a
human experience and must draw increasingly on the dynamic
hermeneutic interaction between physician and patient, so that the
information required to choose optimal therapy may be gathered
and integrated [80]. This complex nature of medicine as a practice
employing both science and art, indicates the necessity to integrate
both of these sources of knowledge and expertise, avoiding a
preferential concentration on scientiﬁc data alone with a conse-
quentneglectofallthoseothervitalaspectsofgoodmedicinewhich
remain central to the work of the good doctor. Those that promote
scientiﬁc medicine and those that emphasize the importance
of applying science to patients within a framework of the arts of
medicine must therefore come together in a spirit of reconciliation.
The real conceptual divide is not between the science base and
the arts base of medicine, but rather between a complete form of
medical practice and an incomplete one [24 ]. I will also go so far
as to say here that while we must remain properly, indeed highly,
cautious of therapies which do not appear to have a biologically or
mechanistically plausible basis for clinical practice at the present
time, we must consider that a detailed understanding of how
suchtherapiesmaywellbeworkingmightonlybeamatterofyears
away. Doctors, with this in mind and reﬂecting upon the nature and
pattern of discovery that we have witnessed within medical history
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from absolutist dismissal of many of the modalities advocated by
complementary and alternative medicine practitioners for integra-
tion into orthodox practice. Integrated (ive) Medicine represents
one of many experimental approaches to medical holism worthy
of detailed investigation in terms of its ability to satisfy patients’
beliefs and preferences and given the many positive results it
has recorded in terms of patient self-reported and independently
observed clinical outcomes and should be critically evaluated
alongside all of the others. Here, the selection of established
research designs, or the development of research designs de novo,
must take into account the nature of the questions to be asked and
must not imagine that the only research questions worth asking
and answering are those that can be tested through randomised
controlled trials and other biomedically reductionist, quantitative
tools. Not to appreciate the same would be scientistic non-science.
By appreciating the limits of biomedical science in the care of
individual patients and by re-integrating the essential arts of medi-
cine back into practice, including the use of compassion, consola-
tion, empathy, insight, discernment and intuition, by listening and
explaining, by being fully present to the person of the patient, by
placing emphasis on relationship and by encouraging an ethical
intimacy, by providing reassurance, by addressing hopes, fears and
anxieties, by providing psychosocial and spiritual/religious care
[26], by attending to the cultural context of the person, by noting
the effects of diet and the environment on health and recognizing
the role of family, friends and signiﬁcant others who provide the
emotional fortitude we have come to call ‘support’, in parallel and
in full integration with scientiﬁcally informed strategies to ame-
liorate, attenuate and cure, we can move from a version of modern
medicine that has become radically incomplete, despite staggering
scientiﬁc progress, in the direction of a medicine which is con-
cerned with people. This approach would enable medicine to be
exercised in a fully contextual manner, making a Medicine for the
Whole Person a perfectly attainable ideal. Having commenced this
Essay with a playful reference to Denzinger, I conclude with one
entirely more profound from Voltaire:
‘Men who are occupied in the restoration of health to other
men, by the joint exertion of skill and humanity, are above all
the great of the earth. They even partake of divinity, since to
preserve and renew is almost as noble as to create’. (italicisa-
tion mine)
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